the aggregate capital stock to fall, while the capital/labour ratio rises. In this case, added government borrowing causes the interest rate to fall. Fourth, the analysis here shows that one cannot test the intergenerational altruism hypothesis simply by testing for neutrality of government debt or social security. This is a consequence of the fact that the neutrality proposition is false when fertility is endogenous.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the basic model of household consumption and fertility behaviour. Section III presents a comparative statics analysis of the response to government borrowing. Sections IV concludes the paper by mentioning some extensions of the results, some of their limitations, and possible directions for future research.
II. A model of fertility behaviour
To keep the model very simple, suppose there exist only two generations, 1 and 2, referred to henceforth as parents and children. Suppose, moreover, that each generation lives only for one period, so that there is no overlap between generations. (These restrictions are not essential to the argument.) The members of each generation are identical, and ui and ci denote, respectively, the utility and consumption per head of each. u2 depends only on c2. However, parental utility u1 is assumed to depend on c1, u2, and n, where n (treated as a continuous variable) is the number of children born to the parents. The presence of u2 in the parental utility function is familiar from models of intergenerational altruism beginning with Barro (1974) . Parents receive a gross wage of w1 (which might also be taken to include any other sources of lump-sum income, such as bequests inherited from prior generations) and pay lump-sum taxes of T1. At death, they pass on a total bequest B to their children, each of whom receives B/n. The total bequest is equal to savings out of net income, w1 -T-c1, times 1 plus the interest rate r, since the bequest occurs at the end of generation 1. Letting R = (1 + r)-1, the budget constraints for generations 1 and 2 are thus: c1 = w1-T1-RB
and C2 = W2-T2 +-E (2) n respectively. These collapse to the intergenerational budget constraint c1+Rnc2=wl-T1+Rn(w2-T2).
(3)
Parents choose c1, n and B to maximize 4 (C1, C2, n) ul(cl, n, U2[C2]) (4) subject to (1) and (2), or, equivalently, they choose c1, c2, and n and to maximize (4) subject to (3). This completes the specification of the basic model.2 The reader can easily verify that the Barro debt neutrality result holds in this model when n is exogenously fixed. The next task is thus to explore what happens when the endogeneity of n is taken into account.
III. Comparative statistics response to feasible policy changes
Throughout most of this section, we assume that equilibrium wage and interest rates are unaffected by changes in government policy. If the economy is small and open, facing a fixed world interest rate, or if the underlying production technology in the economy is linear (i.e., constant marginal products, and thus infinite elasticities of substitution), this assumption will be strictly correct. Otherwise, the analysis must be interpreted as being partial equilibrium in nature. Later on, this assumption is relaxed so that the implications of borrowing for equilibrium factor prices can be discussed.
Feasible policy changes: pure public goods
The basic goal of this section is to see how the equilibrium of the economy depends on government policy. In a Barro economy, government debt policy is synonymous with the intertemporal structure of taxation. A decision to borrow now, for given government (non-transfer) expenditures, 1 Early versions of this paper (Wildasin (1985) ) allowed each generation to live for more than one period, and, in particular, allowed for the lives of parents and children to overlap. In such a model, it is not bequests per se that must be positive. Rather, it is "net parental expenditures on children," which would be the present value of expenses for raising children and net bequests.
2Razin and Ben-Zion (1975), Pazner and Razin (1980), Nerlove et al. (1982 Nerlove et al. ( , 1984 Nerlove et al. ( , 1985 Nerlove et al. ( , 1987 and Cigno (1983) study models that are similar to the present one in their specification of intergenerational preferences. They analyze rather different issues, however, such as efficiency of laissez-faire equilibria, population size in laissez-faire equilibria vs. Benthamite or Millian social welfare optima, or the implications of marriage for bequest behaviour. None of these studies address the debt neutrality problem that is the focus of the present discussion.
is a decision to cut taxes now and to raise them, with interest, in the future. Feasible policy changes must therefore satisfy an intertemporal government budget constraint. The nature of this constraint will depend on the nature of the public goods provided by the government. Two extreme cases will be explicitly analyzed here, and the reader can consider combinations of the two. The first case is that of pure public goods. In this case, we let E1 and E2 represent government expenditure in periods 1 and 2 per family, that is, per member of generation 1. Assume that E1 and E2 are exogenously fixed, so that any effect they might have on the utility of either generation can be subsumed within the structure of the utility function u1 and u2. The government's intertemporal budget constraint requires that T1 + RnT2= E1 + RE2= constant. As is generally the case when the base of a tax is not exogenously fixed, it is possible here that there could be a perverse relationship between the rate of taxation and the amount of tax revenue collected. As a minimum restriction for interesting analysis, assume henceforth that increases in either T1 and T2 alone would actually lead to increases in the present value of tax revenue, at least in the neighbourhood of any initial equilibrium we might wish to consider. This will be true if either T2 or the derivatives of n are not too large. Then the numerator and denominator of the ratio in (7) are both positive, and dT2 < 0.(In particular, dT2 < ? when T2= 0 initially.) Feasible policy changes: quasi-private public goods There is considerable empirical evidence to indicate that many public goods are not purely public. In fact, for many public expenditure categories, it is approximately true that the cost of providing a given level of public service is proportional to the population being served-that is, the public good is "quasi-private." Education, fire and police protection, and health care all exemplify public goods for which larger populations require larger expenditures. To formulate the government budget constraint in the case of quasi-private public goods, let G1 and G2 represent the level of public service in periods 1 and 2, and let G1 and nG2 be the cost per family, in each period, of providing the public goods. Thus, in particular, public expenditures are proportional to population in period 2, the period when population itself is variable. We take G1 and G2 as exogenously fixed, so that their effect on welfare is subsumed within the structure of the utility functions. The government budget constraint is now T1 + RnT2= G1 + RnG2.
(6') Thus, any change in T1 must be accompanied by a change in T2 such that 
where A denotes the denominator in (7) or (7'), as the case may be. The inequality in (10) holds because A > 0 by assumption and because the second-order condition for utility maximization implies that M44 is of sign opposite to IMI. Thus, a debt-financed tax cut for parents (a decrease in T1) unambiguously reduces fertility.3 Note that this result holds independently of the purity or impurity of public goods. It establishes that government debt is definitely not neutral, even though there is intergenerational altruism of the Barro type. The intuition behind the negative effect of borrowing on fertility becomes clear from examination of the intergenerational budget constraint (3), or from the first-order condition for the utility-maximizing choice of n, (5.3). The tax imposed in the second period, T2, is one of the costs of having a child, appearing as a price term in the budget constraint. An increase in borrowing in period 1 means an increase in T2, which is to say that it amounts to an increase in the effective marginal cost of having a child. A balanced-budget change will leave only a substitution effect from the combined changes in taxation in the two periods, as shown in (10).
Second, let us consider the impact of a change in tax policy on consumption expenditure. Depending on whether public goods are purely public or quasi-private, substitute from the government budget constraint (6) or (6') into the household budget constraint (3). We then find that
where it is to be understood here that the term G2 = 0 in the case of purely public goods, corresponding to (6). By (10), it follows that the present value of family consumption (the left-hand side of (11)) must rise when T1 rises if public goods are purely public. Moreover, the same will be true for quasi-private public goods if w2> This expression wil have the sign of T2-G2. In particular, welfare is stationary (and in fact is maximized) when T2= G2. The intuition for this result is as follows: the decision to have another child, when public goods are quasi-private, entails a real social cost of G2, that is, the cost of providing the fixed level of public services to one more individual. If T2= G2, this cost is correctly internalized to the family. If T2> G2, then having additional children yields social benefits in excess of social costs and raising T1, which increases the number of children, raises welfare. If T2 < G2, the opposite reasoning applies. Thus, if T2> G2, T1 should be increased and T2 decreased, while if T2< G2, T1 should be reduced and T2 should be raised. In either case, welfare increases as T2 is brought closer to G2, and is maximal when they are equated. This contrasts sharply with the case of pure public goods.7
5 Cigno (1983) shows that a laissez-faire equilibrium will not be optimal from the viewpoint of a social welfare function that attaches more weight to subsequent generations than the parental utility function. One can see that the same result obtains here. 6 This utility function looks like that of a utilitarian planner that discounts future utility by the factor 6 < 1, and hence let us refer to this specification as utilitarian preferences.8 Of course, 01 and O2 are assumed strictly concave (02 need not, however, be identical to u2.) Given utilitarian preferences, the first-order conditions for c2 and n take the special form These results mean that incremental government borrowing causes parental consumption to rise, and consumption per child to rise, when parental preferences are utilitarian. However, by Proposition 1(ii), the present value of total consumption across both generations must fall in the face of additional government borrowing. Therefore, it must be the case that total consumption by children must fall (in present value terms), that is, that fertility falls proportionately more than c2 rises. Parental bequests rise (in present value terms) by less than their taxes are cut, and bequests per child rise by more than their taxes rise.
It is now possible to show what happens to the capital-labour ratio in period 2. To analyze this, we need to know how the real capital stock changes between periods 1 and 2. The amount of saving in period 1, per family, is RB. If there were no debt instruments in the economy, all of this 8 The assumption of utilitarian parental preferences is in some respects similar to the Becker and Tomes (1979) and Becker (1981) assumption that parental utilty depends on the total wealth of their children, i.e., the number of children times wealth per child, and appears explicitly in Cigno (1983). Becker and Barro (1988) consider a function like (14), but assume strict concavity in n. Note that strict concavity of 4 in n is not necessary for a unique interior choice of n. The easiest way to see this is as follows. For notational ease, let fv2 = R(w2 -T2). Then the second-oder condition for a strict maximum of (14) subject to (3) is that (see, e.g., Intriligator (1971) Hence feasible government borrowing increases the capital/labour ratio in period 2. Usually it is argued that government borrowing will depress savings and investment, at least in a full-employment economy, and that this will inhibit capital deepening. Here, however, we find that this latter inference can be invalidated, since, even if borrowing does reduce investment, it also reduces population, and may reduce population proportionately more.
The analysis so far has assumed fixed factor prices, either because the economy is small and open or because the production technology is linear. Let us now relax this assumption. Suppose that the economy is closed, and that the production technology, although still characterized by constant returns to scale, is such that labour and capital are no longer perfect substitutes.10 With such a technology, an increase in the period-2 capital/labour ratio must increase labour productivity and wages in period 2, while reducing the interest rate. The analysis presented above can be thought of as describing the initial impact of a change in policy on the capital labour ratio, with fixed factor prices. If borrowing raises the capital/labour ratio at fixed factor prices, then allowing factor prices to adjust in response to policy should tend to dampen, but not reverse, the increase in the capital/labour ratio and the other real effects of government borrowing. This intuition is in fact correct, as shown formally in the 9 D could include debt carried forward from prior periods. If the economy is closed, K is the amount of capital stock per family in the economy. If the economy is open, K still denotes real capital per family, but this will be greater than the domestic capital stock per family if the economy is a capital exporter and conversely if it is a capital importer. The capital/labour ratio, -, is therefore the stock of wealth per worker. n 10 A linear production technology means that isoquants are straight lines, and hence that the elasticity of substitution is infinite. We now allow for curved, strictly convex isoquants, implying less than perfect substitutability and variable factor prices.
Appendix. This means that government borrowing will have an effect on capital intensity and factor prices that is the reverse of what is usually found.
In summary, the above discussion establishes Proposition 2. With utilitarian parental preferences, with either pure or quasi-private public goods, an increase in government borrowing results in: (i) an increase in parental consumption and in consumption per child, (ii) an increase in the present value of total bequests that is less than the amount of additional government borrowing, (iii) an increase in bequests per child that exceeds the increase in taxes per child, (iv) an increase in the capital/labour ratio, and (v) in a closed economy with less than infinite substitutability in production between capital and labour an increase in the wage rate and a reduction in the interest rate.
In recent years, there has been a great deal of discussion of the impact of public debt and social security on saving and capital accumulation. In the usual framework in which these discussions are undertaken, fertility is treated as exogenously fixed. Hence, increases or decreases of the aggregate capital stock imply corresponding changes in the amount of capital per head, output per head, factor prices, and so on. The simultaneous movement of all of these variables in the conventional directions have come to be regarded as symptoms of economic "growth" (or lack thereof, as the case may be). With endogenous fertility, however, these variables can move in unconventional directions, so that the concept of economic "growth" itself becomes ambiguous. A fortiori, the effect of public policies like tax cuts or unfunded social security have ambiguous impacts on "growth," as measured by conventional indicators.
To appreciate this, note first that (10) shows that borrowing reduces fertility, and thus the total amount of labour in the economy, quite generally. Furthermore, under utilitarian preferences, borrowing increases consumption per head for both parents and children. This entails an increase in utility per head for generation 2. However, if public goods are pure, or if public goods are quasi-private and there is an initial deficit (T1 < G1), additional borrowing decreases utility for generation 1 (Prop. 1(iii)). In addition, as seen in (17), it would (in a closed economy) increase the capital/labour ratio, labour productivity, and the wage-rental ratio. These factor price effects, and the change in the intertemporal distribution of utility per head, are generally regarded as aspects of economic growth. In this sense, borrowing promotes economic growth. This finding not only contradicts the Barro neutrality result for economies with altruistic bequests. It also reverses the standard conclusions about the effect of borrowing in economies with life-cycle utility maximizers who leave no bequests.
On the other hand, Proposition 1(ii) and Proposition 2(i) show that (given utilitarian preferences) borrowing reduces the present value of total consumption, which occurs because the total consumption of generation 2 is reduced. The reduction in population induced by the programme is thus sufficient to reduce aggregate future consumption. Moreover, if public goods are pure, or if they are quasi-private and there is an initial deficit, incremental borrowing reduces the aggregate utility of the second generation. (Proof: By (16.1), cl increases, hence 01 in (14) must rise. The fact that 0 falls-Prop. 1(iii)-means that nO2 must fall enough to offset the increase in 01.) Since cl increases (Proposition 2(i)), borrowing also results in a smaller total capital stock. In these respects, government borrowing tends to reduce economic growth.
In summary, then, it might be best to characterize the effect of borrowing, given utilitarian preferences, as conducive to economic growth in its micro aspects (e.g., in terms of the capital/labour ratio, factor prices, utility per head) but detrimental to economic growth in its macro aspects (total consumption, total factor supplies, total utility). The differences between the two types of effects arise, of course, because the programme reduces fertility, permitting aggregative measures of growth to fall while micro measures increase. It remains to note some of the limitations of the analysis. To begin with, it rests on certain behavioural hypotheses that (perhaps to put it mildly) do not command universal acceptance. Chiefly, the assumption that parents care about the welfare of their children, as the children themselves define it, is open to some question. Intergenerational utility maximization of this type is, of course, crucial to the Barro neutrality result when fertility is exogenous. In examining the neutrality proposition with endogenous fertility it is natural to maintain the intergenerational utility maximization assumption, since it is obvious that borrowing cannot be neutral otherwise. That is, we have analyzed the impact of borrowing in a model in which it is least likely to have real effects. It therefore seems very likely that neutrality of debt will occur only exceptionally in models with endogenous fertility.
IV. Further applications and conclusions
Finally, what of empirical importance of the effect of government policy on fertility? Obviously, this issue cannot be settled on a priori grounds. From the viewpoint of armchair empiricism, one might argue that the effect of a small change in the level of debt on fertility must be small as well. However, the level of unfunded social security liabilities and outstanding government debt is certainly very large for many countries. If one asks, therefore, whether such public policies have significant effects on fertility, the answer might well be no, for small policy changes, but yes, for changes of the order of magnitude observed during, say, the past half-century.
There is already a substantial number of empirical studies bearing on this issue, and a typical finding is that social security programmes have significant effects on social security. 12 However, the link between theory and empirical work in this area is rather weak. For example, existing empirical studies make no reference to the degree of funding of social security programmes, typically using a simple measure of benefit payouts as a regressor to represent program size. Yet as shown in the analysis above, the degree to which a social security programme is funded or underfunded may well be a crucial determinant of the programme's impact on fertility. This fact well illustrates the need for explicit theoretical analysis. In brief, the empirical issues cannot be adequately investigated in the absence of fully-articulated theoretical models, of which this paper has provided one example.
Indiana University, USA APPENDIX This Appendix presents a formal proof of Proposition 2(v). We now assume that factor prices in period 2 are determined in competitive markets, and that production occurs under conditions of constant returns to scale. As is well-known, this implies that factor prices depend only on the capital/labour ration K/n. 
